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 Compare e.g. Baumol et al, 1988, pp. 347 - 360.
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 Compare Witteloostuijn (1990) p. 213.
     
3
 Compare e.g. Becker (1983), p. 17.
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 This figure is roughly 0.254. That is one of the reasons to confine the domain fo ε. Alternatively,
there could be also risk-aversion of the worker assumed or a lower outside option of the monopolistic
worker. This would increase the range of ε.
εpi
εε
ε ε ≈
                                                            
     
5
 The last term in (3.25) is approximately [0.43,0.76]α within the range of ε, while the last expression
in (3.5) gives accordingly [0,0.23]α. 
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 See e.g. Lindbeck/Snower (1988) p. 246f.
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7
 See e.g. Schwartz (1986) p. 42.
     
8
 Compare Shepherd (1984), p.537.
     
9
 Compare Robert Hart (1984), p. 35.
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 See Witteloostuijn (1990) p. 217.
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 Tirole (1988) observes that sunk costs always have a commitment value, see p. 314.
 The game is modelled like a Stackelberg-game where the incumbent enjoys a first-mover advantage,
confer e.g. the model presented in Tirole (1988), p. 315f.
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 The correlation between the profits are given under the assumption that the investment of the insider
is larger than the investment of the outsider. It will be shown later that this always the case in equilibrium.
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 We can concentrate on these three cases, because we look for Nash-equilibria. As a posteriori only
the three values for Ω are possible, we can also assume that a-priori and check, if a Nash-equilibrium is
reached onder the parameter constellation and the reaction structure of the potential entrant.
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 Intuition: a low investment z is just reached, if (vx-u) is large and ε is small. In this case spre is just
a little larger than vx. The surplus with accomodation sacc is in this case however smaller than vx (compare
(4.19)).
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 See Stiglitz (1987), pp. 889f.
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